	3 July 1956 Copy No. 105 ED
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. IX I: DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR.70-2 DATE DATE DATE DOCUMENT NO. AUTHORN TO THE
	CURRENT INTELLIGENCE NTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1A		
Approved For Relea	se 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00	975A002600300001-9

CONTENTS

25X1		
25X1	2. SOVIET RESOLUTION ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN	25X1A
	3. POZNAN SITUATION	
	4. HUNGARIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION CON- DEMNS "ANTIPARTY" GROUP	25X1A
		25X1
	6. DALAI LAMA REPORTEDLY SEEKING ASYLUM	25X1A
		25X1
	8. SOVIET LEADERS EXPECT RECORD HARVEST	25X1A
		25X1
	10. PAKISTANI-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT (page 13).	,
	* * *	25X1A
	THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION	·
	25X1A	
	3 July 56 25X1ACurrent Intelligence Bulletin Page 2	

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

2. SOVIET RESOLUTION ON ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN

25X1A .

The lengthy central committee resolution of 30 June explaining and justifying the anti-Stalin campaign is an attempt by the Soviet regime to provide an answer to questions recently raised by foreign Communist parties.

In tones frequently defensive, the resolution attempts to demonstrate that Stalin's errors in no way discredit the Soviet system as such nor its present leaders and policies.

The resolution reviews Stalin's errors but states that they were expressed in methods rather than goals and contends that the Soviet system developed consistently and progressively despite these errors. Stalinism, it asserts, "could not change and has not changed the nature of our social order," and it rebukes Italian Communist leader Togliatti for raising the question.

As to guarantees for the future, the resolution argues that the historical conditions which gave birth to Stalinism have passed forever and cites post-Stalin changes as proof.

The resolution asserts that the Soviet party launched the anti-Stalin campaign deliberately with an eye to "a positive result from the point of view of the ultimate aims" of the Communist movement, and calls for a closing of ranks against Western attempts to exploit "temporary difficulties."

The resolution abruptly dismisses the question of the current leaders' responsibility for Stalinism with the

3 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 4

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

statement that it is "in no way a question of lack of personal courage." An attempt to check Stalin in his later years, the resolution argues, would have been misunderstood by the Soviet public.

The resolution offers little that is new in its analysis of Stalin's role and the socialist system in the USSR. Most of the points it makes have already been presented in both Soviet and Western Communist statements.

25X1A

3 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

3. POZNAN SITUATION

The situation in Poznan is quiet, but there are signs that the riots have aroused concern in other Soviet bloc countries. According to embassy offi-25X1A cials who visited Poznan on 1 July, all tanks had been withdrawn from the city the night before, telegraph and telephone communications had been restored, and transportation facilities were normal.

Militia checkpoints, however, remained on the outskirts of the city and at various points between Poznan and Warsaw. Border units on the East German-Polish border have also reportedly been strengthened.

The other bloc countries have echoed the Polish line that the riots were due to the activities of a reactionary underground and have called for increased vigi-

lance to prevent similar outbreaks. 25X1

3 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 6

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

25X1

4,	HUNGARIAN CENT	TRAL COMN	MITTEE	RESOLUTION
	CONDEMNS "ANT	IPARTY" GI	ROUP	

The Hungarian party leadership has made its first major effort since the Soviet 20th Party Congress to check the 'moderate' faction and whip the party rank and file back in line.

A Hungarian central committee resolution, published on 30 June, sharply condemned a "malignant antiparty movement formed around Imre Nagy" which has launched an attack "gradually increasing in strength against the policy and leadership of our party." The resolution specifically cited the "Poznan provocations" as a warning to every Hungarian "to oppose firmly attempts at troublemaking."

This sharp attack is in reaction to outspoken criticism of leading Hungarian Communists, made in a series of meetings of journalists, economists, philosophers, youths, World War II resistance fighters and intellectuals in the past few weeks.

The resolution indicates that Rakosi's leadership was re-endorsed in early June by Soviet presidium member Suslov, who was then in Budapest analyzing the problem of Hungarian factionalism, and at the end of June by Soviet leaders during Rakosi's reported visit to Moscow.

25X1A

3 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7

25X1A

6. DALAI LAMA REPORTEDLY SEEKING ASYLUM

O. DVITVI IVI	MA HEROTTEDEL SERIMO ESTECH	
<1A	·	
consider N seek Amer	The Dalai Lama is anxious to according to a statement mad Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim to a consular officials in Calcutta Although India reportedly has grant asylum, the Dalai Lama's advise w Delhi's favorable response as firm ican assurances of sanctuary elsewheresylum in India is refused.	e by the American on 28 June been re- ers do not enough and
in eastern	The Maharaj Kumar said figh Tibet, but additional arms are needed	ting is seve
	g to other parts of the country.	
Comment	The Chinese Communists indoor the Dalai Lama's loyalty w	hen they re-
	rmit him to attend Buddhist festivals	
	Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, who went	
extend an 1	nvitation on behalf of a Buddhist socie a expressed a keen desire to attend the	ty, said int e ceremoni
Peiping's r	efusal may have been the final factor	in bringing
Dalai Lam	a to a decision to seek asylum outside	Tibet.
3 July 56	Current Intelligence Bulletin	Page !
	25X1A	

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

	8. SOVIET LE	ADERS EXPECT RECORD HARVEST	
	25X1A		
25X1A	year would	At a reception in Moscow on 2 several Soviet officials express satisfaction with the harvest p for this year. Khrushchev sating the country as a whole, procations were that the Soviet has be "record" and he was very pleased.	ssed great rospects id that tak- esent indi- arvest this
	lands," pres substantiall fairly good, percent inc 100,000,000 the size of	On the basis of these statement observations by officers of the no recently traveled through parts of the sent prospects are that the 1956 harve by above that of 1955. In 1955 the harve with grain production showing an annurease over the 1950 level and amounting metric tons. A major drought serious crops in the "new lands" last year, but ine was excellent.	e American he "new est may be vest was counced 29- ng to over usly reduced
	the North C lands!' In a lands'' is 50 last.	Previous statements by Sovieth had indicated that crop prosperair in the Ukraine, but were good to elaucasus and Volga regions, as well as addition, the area under cultivation in percent or 25,000,000 acres greater 5X1A	ects this year xcellent in s in the "new the "new
	3 July 56	Current Intelligence Bulletin	Page 11
		25X1A	1
	•		·

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

10. PAKISTANI-SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT

The Pakistani-Soviet trade agreement concluded on 27 June appears to portend no significant change in relations between the two countries.

The agreement provides for the exchange of Pakistani agricultural products for Soviet machinery, industrial agricultural products for Soviet machinery. A special are

of Pakistani agricultural products for Soviet machinery, industrial equipment, petroleum, and timber. A special arrangement is included under which payments will be in rupees, and a Soviet trade office is to be established in Karachi. There has been no official announcement of the duration of the agreement, although the Pakistani press reports it is for one year, renewable on mutual agreement. No mention of technical or economic aid is included.

The Pakistani government has apparently been careful to minimize the opportunities for Soviet economic penetration. Soviet requests to establish trade offices at Lahore and Dacca were rejected, but permission was given to open an office in Karachi. Conclusion of the trade agreement avoids an open rebuff to Moscow's recent overtures and will probably satisfy some Pakistani businessmen who have been eager to find new trading partners.

3 July 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 13

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 2 July)

The Israeli ambassador in Moscow is trying to secure an invitation from the Soviet Union for Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to visit the USSR, according to a news correspondent in Tel Aviv. An unsuccessful effort to arrange such a visit was made in late 1955, the report stated, but the recent change of foreign minister in Israel might result in a positive reply. 25X1A		Egypti	an machine-g	gun fire was di	rected at
ing to secure an invitation from the Soviet Union for Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to visit the USSR, according to a news correspondent in Tel Aviv. An unsuccessful effort to arrange such a visit was made in late 1955, the report stated, but the recent change of foreign minister in Israel might result in a positive reply. 25X1A 3 July 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 14	an Israeli pat spokesman. [rol near the G	aza strip, ac	ccording to an	Israeli 25X1A
U daily U daily Call and an	Minister Ben- respondent in a visit was m change of fore reply.	an invitation for an invitatio	from the Sovi it the USSR, n unsuccessfo 55, the repor	iet Union for P according to a ul effort to arr rt stated, but t	rime news cor- ange such he recent
U daily U daily Call and an	•			•	·
25X1A	3 July 56	Current	Intelligence	Bulletin	Page 14
		25X1	Α]

Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A002600300001-9